Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Middle East Eye, 9 June 2026

Weekend strikes highlight Tehran’s shifting strategic calculus – and a refusal to remain bound by one-sided agreements

As conflict flared up again this weekend between Israel and Iran, negotiations with the US have failed to produce any agreement. Neither side can afford another war, but the path towards a diplomatic settlement has been stymied by Washington’s demands for far-reaching concessions from Iran, without any offer of commensurate reciprocal measures, such as the release of even a portion of Iran’s frozen assets.

After the US and Israeli military strikes on Iran in 2025 and again this year, western discussions largely focused on the physical damage inflicted on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure, its uranium enrichment capabilities, and its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. 

In Iran, however, the central question is different: did negotiations and nuclear restraint produce greater security, or did they ultimately create heightened vulnerability?

The reality is that the US-Israeli wars on Iran inflicted significant damage on its nuclear and military facilities. But the ongoing conflict has also imposed enormous costs on the US – including more than $1 trillion in expenditures, significant damage to US military assets, global economic disruption, and substantial civilian and military casualties.

At the same time, the US-Israeli campaign has achieved few of its stated objectives, namely to eliminate Iran’s missile capabilities, end its nuclear programme, and facilitate political change. What the wars did change, however, was Iran’s strategic calculus, producing four major shifts in this regard. 

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Firstly, we have seen the collapse of a strategy built on restraint and engagement. Despite a broad consensus among observers that Iran had complied with the 2015 nuclear deal, accepting extensive restrictions and unprecedented inspections, the US unilaterally withdrew from the agreement just three years later, and the military attacks followed. 

As a result, confidence in the idea that diplomacy and nuclear restraint can guarantee security has been severely damaged. For many Iranians, restraint is now increasingly viewed not as protection, but as vulnerability.

Central question

Secondly, public trust in the US has collapsed. While Iran’s leadership has long been sceptical of Washington, public opinion was often different. 

After the signing of the nuclear agreement a decade ago, optimism in Iran was widespread, with a Gallup survey at the time finding that 68 percent of Iranians believed their leaders had negotiated a good deal, 66 percent expected economic improvement, and 51 percent anticipated better relations with the US.

Today, the debate inside Iran is no longer primarily about centrifuges or enrichment levels. The central question has become: if Iran accepts new restrictions, what guarantees exist that a future US administration will not abandon the agreement, or that another military confrontation will not follow? For many Iranians, the current crisis is less a nuclear dispute than a crisis of trust.

Even voices that previously advocated de-escalation now emphasise the need for credible deterrent capabilities

Thirdly, we have seen a shift from ideology to nationalism. For decades, confrontation with the US and Israel was framed primarily in ideological terms. The recent conflict appears to have produced a different dynamic: while many Iranians remain opposed to war, sanctions and isolation, public sentiment has increasingly shifted towards a form of everyday nationalism.

Rather than strengthening ideological narratives, external military pressure has reinforced broader feelings of national identity and collective solidarity. This trend may become one of the most enduring political consequences of the wars.

Finally, perhaps the most important shift concerns deterrence. Even voices that previously advocated de-escalation now emphasise the need for credible deterrent capabilities.

This does not necessarily imply support for nuclear weapons; rather, it reflects a growing belief that no political agreement can remain sustainable unless Iran possesses sufficient means to deter future attacks.

This shift played out in real-time over the weekend, as Iran launched strikes against Israel over the latter’s continuing assault on Tehran’s ally Lebanon – marking the first time Iran has hit Israel not as retaliation for attacks on its own territory, but as a warning over continuing ceasefire violations in Lebanon.

Strategic framework

Following the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran’s security doctrine rested on three pillars: strengthening indigenous military capabilities (which eventually produced the missile, drone and cyber capabilities displayed in the recent conflict), achieving self-sufficiency in nuclear technology and domestic fuel production, and extending deterrence beyond Iran’s borders through its regional “axis of resistance”.

When it comes to shaping Iran’s future security doctrine, the strategic impact of the 2025 and 2026 wars may ultimately exceed even that of Saddam Hussein’s invasion, since the US-Israeli assaults were widely perceived inside Iran as direct threats to national survival and sovereignty. 

Consequently, a revised strategic framework appears to be emerging around four principles.

The first can be summarised as “security for all or security for none”. After the 2025 US-Israeli attacks, Iran’s military response was largely confined to Israel and a single American base in the Gulf. 

During the 2026 conflict, however, Iran’s strategic calculations expanded to include US military installations across the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and broader global economic interests. From Tehran’s perspective, the lesson is clear: security can no longer be treated as a unilateral privilege. Either there is security for all regional actors, or security for none.

Secondly, we have seen the emergence of a new key factor: public opinion. Before the wars, Iran’s strategic debate largely revolved around two concepts: the “battlefield” and “diplomacy”. The recent wars added a third: the street. 

The wave of nationalism that emerged was reflected in large public gatherings across major cities. While supporting national defence, many participants also conveyed a message to policymakers that excessive trust in negotiations with Washington is no longer acceptable.

As a result, Iranian diplomacy today increasingly operates under the influence of both military institutions and public opinion.

Thirdly, the emerging consensus emphasises deterrence through a combination of instruments: stronger military capabilities, preservation of nuclear expertise, continued regional partnerships, and incorporation of the Strait of Hormuz into broader security calculations. The result is a more comprehensive understanding of deterrence than the one that existed before the wars.

Finally, the loss of Iran’s supreme leader, military commanders, regional partners and hundreds of civilians has created a powerful collective memory that will shape Iranian perceptions for years to come. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was not only the leader of a state; he was also one of the most prominent Shia religious authorities, with millions of followers worldwide. 

For the first time in modern history, a leading Shia religious authority was killed in military action by foreign states. This is not an event that many Iranians or Shia communities around the world are likely to forget.

After the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in 2020, US officials openly expressed concerns over possible Iranian retaliation. Recent conflicts have led not only to the killings of numerous senior Iranian military leaders, but also to the assassinations of key figures within the broader “axis of resistance”, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas negotiator Ismail Haniyeh. 

It would be unwise for policymakers and security institutions to dismiss the potential long-term security consequences of these events.

Window for diplomacy

Meanwhile, despite widespread mistrust, diplomacy remains far from dead. Although some Iranian political figures fear that another military confrontation may be on the horizon, significant support for diplomacy still exists within Iran. 

What has changed is not the desire for negotiations, but the expectations surrounding any future agreement. If the nuclear deal focused primarily on nuclear restrictions, many in Tehran now argue that any future agreement must contain three key elements.

Firstly, nonproliferation within the framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must protect Iran’s right to enrich uranium, while building confidence that Tehran will not pursue nuclear weapons.

Secondly, meaningful economic benefits must come through substantial sanctions relief. And thirdly, any deal needs to include credible assurances that this military conflict will not be repeated.

Despite the deep mistrust generated by recent wars, diplomacy remains the only viable path forward – because neither Iran, nor the US, nor indeed the region as a whole can escape the realities of coexistence. The central challenge is in breaking a decades-long cycle of crisis, sanctions, negotiations, agreements, collapse and renewed conflict, which neither military force nor economic pressure has resolved. 

The most important consequence of the recent wars is not a shift in Iran’s relative strength, but a transformation in its understanding of security. 

A broad consensus is emerging inside Iran that security, trust, deterrence and diplomacy are inseparable. Unless Washington and its regional allies recognise this shift, future agreements are likely to remain temporary, while the cycle of confrontation continues.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/iran-will-no-longer-accept-endless-talks-it-creating-deterrence-its-own-terms

Seyed Hossein Mousavian-NDTV-India- May 18, 2026

The Strait of Hormuz has evolved from a regional maritime chokepoint into the central geopolitical fault line of the global economy. During the past several weeks, tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran escalated sharply following military exchanges near the Strait, US naval operations connected to “Project Freedom”, attacks on commercial shipping, and reciprocal accusations of ceasefire violations. Commercial traffic through the Strait has been severely disrupted, oil prices have surged, and global shipping insurers have warned of systemic economic risks extending far beyond the Middle East.

Today, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz has become more consequential than the Iranian nuclear dispute itself. The nuclear issue had already been addressed diplomatically through United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a binding international framework. The unilateral US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, followed by unlawful and unnecessary military attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, fundamentally undermined the agreement and transformed the Iranian nuclear issue from a multilateral diplomatic matter into a broader geopolitical confrontation between Iran and a coalition composed of the United States, Israel, and several US-aligned Arab governments in the Persian Gulf.

Iran Has Suffered Massive Damage

Unlike the nuclear issue, however, instability in the Strait of Hormuz directly affects the entire global economy, including energy markets, supply chains, inflation, food security, and maritime commerce. Iran frames the Strait of Hormuz within the doctrine of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. From Tehran’s perspective, repeated military attacks by Iraq under Saddam Hussein during the 1980s, the extensive economic sanctions regime imposed by the United States, cyber operations, targeted assassinations, and the more recent Israeli and American military strikes in 2025 and 2026, have cumulatively imposed trillions of dollars in damage on Iran’s infrastructure, economy, and national security. Iranian government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani said an early estimate indicates that Iran has suffered about $270 billion in damages since the start of the US-Israel war on February 28, 2026.

The United States and several European governments have argued that Iran cannot lawfully impose transit tolls or fees on vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz because such a precedent could encourage other littoral states to impose similar charges in international straits. “Not only is this illegal, it’s unacceptable. It’s dangerous for the world, and it’s important that the world have a plan to confront it,” said the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. Legally, the concern reflects the transit passage regime under Articles 37-44 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which protects freedom of navigation through international straits.

An Inaccurate Argument

However, the comparison between Iran and other coastal states is fundamentally flawed. No other littoral state governing a strategic strait has experienced three major illegal military confrontations – Saddam Hussein’s invasion, prolonged US coercive policies, and direct Israeli-American military operations against its territory – while also bearing the primary burden of maintaining regional maritime security and environmental protection.

While Iran has never ratified the convention, however, under international law, Iran may not be legally entitled to impose unilateral tolls merely for innocent or transit passage. Nevertheless, several alternative legal and institutional mechanisms could provide a lawful framework for cost-sharing and compensation.

First, UNCLOS permits coastal states to recover costs for specific services rendered, including pilotage support, environmental protection, emergency rescue operations, anti-pollution measures, maritime traffic management, demining, and navigational safety systems. Iran could, therefore, lawfully establish specialised maritime service regimes tied to concrete operational services rather than simple passage itself.

Second, Article 43 of UNCLOS explicitly encourages burden-sharing agreements between user states and coastal states in international straits. This provision has remained largely underdeveloped globally. Iran could, therefore, advocate the establishment of a multilateral “Hormuz Maritime Security and Environmental Protection Fund” under United Nations or International Maritime Organization supervision. Such a mechanism would allow energy-importing states, shipping companies, insurers, and Persian Gulf energy exporters to contribute financially toward maintaining safe navigation, environmental protection, anti-piracy operations, and post-conflict reconstruction in the region. This approach would transform the debate from “illegal tolls” into lawful cooperative burden-sharing.

Third, Iran could invoke emerging principles within international environmental law and the law of state responsibility. The recent military confrontations in the Persian Gulf have significantly increased risks of environmental catastrophe, including oil spills, destruction of marine ecosystems, and contamination of fisheries and coastal infrastructure. Under the “polluter pays” principle and broader doctrines of state responsibility, states contributing to militarisation and conflict in the Strait may bear obligations toward remediation and reconstruction. Iran may, therefore, argue that states participating in military escalation should contribute financially to environmental protection and maritime stabilisation efforts in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Question Of Compensation

Fourth, there is a historical imbalance in international compensation mechanisms that remains unresolved. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations Compensation Commission established an international mechanism to process claims and compensation. Iran, despite suffering enormous destruction during Iraq’s invasion of Iran initiated by Saddam Hussein in 1980, never received a comparable compensation framework. The absence of such mechanisms has contributed to long-term regional instability and mistrust between Iran and the Arab neighbouring countries, which supported Saddam’s invasion of Iran.

An Imbalanced Framework

A future Hormuz framework could, therefore, integrate both maritime security financing and broader reconstruction arrangements connected to decades of regional conflict. The strategic reality is that the Strait of Hormuz can no longer be treated merely as a narrow legal issue of navigational rights. It has become a test case for whether international law can adapt to asymmetrical burdens imposed on regional states in periods of prolonged geopolitical confrontation. The existing framework places the overwhelming responsibility for securing one of the world’s most vital energy corridors on the coastal states of Iran and Oman in the Hormuz Strait, while the economic benefits are distributed globally. Such an imbalance is politically unsustainable under conditions of war, sanctions, and repeated military escalation.

Ultimately, the future of the Strait of Hormuz depends not on military coercion but on diplomatic innovation. A durable solution requires de-escalation between Iran, the United States, and the international community, restoration of lawful diplomacy, and creation of a multilateral framework balancing freedom of navigation with equitable burden-sharing, environmental protection, and regional reconstruction. Without such a framework, the Strait risks becoming a permanent epicentre of global economic instability. With it, however, Hormuz could evolve from a symbol of confrontation into a platform for cooperative security and international legal innovation.

https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/us-iran-war-coercion-cant-calm-hormuz-innovation-might-11510523